Politics of Pain : "A Good Subject for Eminent Amateurs" by Moscoso Sanabria, Javier
  
DOSSIER Emotions History 
Rubrica Contemporanea, vol. 4, n. 7, 2015 
ISSN. 2014-5748  
67 
 
Politics of Pain: “A Good Subject for Eminent Amateurs” 
 
Javier MOSCOSO 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
 
Since those days in which Lucien Febvre wrote his now widely quoted paper on the 
history of emotions, the connection between the past and the present has become 
increasingly pressing
1
. The advantages and uses of history for present life, to use 
Nietzsche’s expression, happen to be even more telling when one comes to write the 
history of the emotional experiences. Opposing the “impersonal history”, the history of 
ethereal ideas or heartless institutions, Febvre defended a new form of historical 
narrative that would finally refrain from turning our universe into a stinking pit of 
corpses. While few pages of his paper examined sources and methodological 
difficulties, the most exciting manifesto came at the very end of the piece. In a notorious 
final paragraph, the French historian advocated for a new form of history that would, 
eventually, emerge from this psychological approach: a history understood as a 
connection between ancient and new; a history viewed as “our own history, a perpetual 
sentimental history of resurgences and resurrections”2. His plea for a massive inquiry 
for sensibility in history called into question not just the idolatry of the facts, but the 
conception of a past too distant from the present. When Febvre wrote that the historical 
study of psychology was “a good subject for eminent amateurs”, he was arguing against 
the dead ends to which disciplinary and self-absorbed professionalism seemed to lead. 
What he judged as the revival of primitive forces, the exaltation of cruelty at the 
expense of love, or the proliferation of animal behaviour at the expense of culture, had 
to be widely researched and accounted for, not just for the sake of the past, but for the 
understanding of the present. Outside the servitudes and requirements of professional 
historians, only amateurs were willing to enjoy the freedom required to undertake the 
task. Given the political situation of the 1940’s, the political nature of this 
historiographical revolution could not be questioned. The new “sentimental history” 
would have to explain the resilience of primitive emotional forces that threatened 
culture.  
Febvre, of course, was not alone in this plea. At the very end of their Dialectik 
der Aufklärung, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer followed a similar line of 
thought. The triumphant history of the Enlightenment had to face the brutal and 
irrational forces uncovered by the Nazi regime. The diversification and density of the 
civilization process described by Norbert Elias, or the secularization and 
disenchantment of the world, in Max Weber’s terms, had come to a dead end, as the 
massive proliferation of ritual murder came to demonstrate. Underneath the known 
history of Europe, claimed Adorno and Horkheimer, there was an underground history: 
the history of the human instincts and passions repressed or defaced by civilization
3
. As 
                                                 
1. Lucien FEBVRE, “Sensibility and History: How to Write the Emotional Life of the Past”, in Peter 
BURKE, ed., A New Kind of History from the Writings of Lucien Febvre, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1973, pp. 12-26. The citation is from page 26.  
2. Ibidem, p. 26 
3. Th. W. ADORNO and HORKHEIMER, Dialectik der Aufklärung, in Gesammelte Schriften, 3, Frankfurt 
am Main, Surkhamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1997, p. 265.  
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in the case of Febvre, the past and the present of Western reason - the history of the 
enlightened subject - collide with the research into purely irrational elements, whose 
definitive presence could no longer be denied. 
This connection between the history of emotions and the political dimension of 
history has also been underlined, though from a very different perspective, by many 
contemporary authors. According to the historian Ruth Leys, for example, the so-called 
“affective turn” was motivated by the desire to undermine the role of reason and 
rationality in politics, ethics, and aesthetics. In other words, the cultural analysis of 
emotions and passions arouse from the need to unravel the hidden affects that govern 
political decisions. Ley specifically cites the philosopher Brian Massumi, for whom our 
affects had to be viewed independently of, and in an important sense prior to, intentions, 
meanings, reasons and beliefs.
4
 Since affects were defined as autonomic processes that 
took place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning, the history of the 
emotions had to deal with the progressive uncovering of those “inhuman” and “pre-
subjective” forces and intensities that, though unconscious, lay at the very core of our 
goals and intentions
5
.  
More recently, scholars have given shelter to new theoretical frameworks in 
which the history of emotions collided with political claims. For the ethno-historian 
Monique Sheer, for example, emotions are a kind of practice
6
. In a similar line, the 
historian Joanna Bourke has described pain as “a type of event”7. In both cases, this 
performative view of emotions has consequences not just with regard to the way in 
which we should envision subjectivity and its history. Their approach comes to suggest 
that, thinking otherwise, claiming that emotions are somehow only natural and entirely 
autonomous of the self, would imply to “depoliticize emotions by naturalizing them and 
endowing them with fundamental autonomy, thus denying their social and historical 
contingency”8. “As a public ‘type of event’, writes Bourke, [pain] is a political 
practice”9. And rightly so, since the differentiation between true and feigned pain 
implies the mobilization of many social resources and rhetorical tools, as the recent 
book by Keith Wailoo has come to demonstrate.
10
  
Unfortunately, the political dimension of “sentimental history” (à la Febvre) 
does not come naturally. On the contrary, the history of emotions, in general, or the 
history of emotional practices, in particular, must avoid falling into the trap of 
.erformative contradictions”, as noticed by historian William M. Reddy11. This is the 
                                                 
4. Ruth LEYS, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique”, Critical Inquiry, 37 (May 2011), pp. 434–472.  
5. Ibidem, p. 437.  
6. Monique SHEER, “Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them to have a history)? A 
Bourdieuian approach to understanding emotion”, History and Theory, 51, (May 2012), pp. 193-220.  
7. Joanna BOURKE, The Story of Pain. From Prayers to Painkillers, Oxford, OUP, 2014.  
8. SHEER, “Are emotions a kind of practice?”, p. 208.  
9. BOURKE, The Story of Pain, p. 18.  
10. Keith WAILOO, Pain. A Political History. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.  
11. W. M. REDDY, “Humanists and the Experimental Study of Emotion”, in Frank BIESS and Daniel M. 
GROSS (eds.), Science and Emotions after 1945, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2014, 
pp. 41-66; p. 47. See also Martin JAY, “The Debate Over The Performative Contradiction: Habermas 
Versus the Poststructuralists,” in Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, 
ed. Axel HONNETH, Thomas MCCARTHY, Claus OFFE, and Albrecht WELLMER, MIT Press, pp. 261–279. 
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kind of criticism that Habermas made of Michel Foucault’s analysis of the self and his 
regimen of truth and error; a type of self-referential paradox very common in all those 
authors whose academic training has granted them the notorious ability to speak from 
the point of view of nowhere. Though widely spread, the most common form of this 
inconsistency usually appears when the distribution of credit is involved. For many 
social constructionists, even if all other intellectual merit must be explained by the 
confluence of social interests, the academic value of their own contributions cannot 
possibly be assessed that way. On the contrary, their own relationship with the truth-
value of their historical or sociological statements seems to be the most remarkable 
exception to their own golden rule. In this vein, their analytical claims seem to come 
from an exceptional epistemological place, a Karl Mannheim’s intelligentsia refuge, 
which, in a non-defined sense, cannot possibly be socially mediated or constructed.
12
 In 
the case of the history of emotions, performative contradictions usually take the form of 
an alleged neutral position with regard to the emotions of the past and the politics of the 
present. In a very recent book, David Carr has shown the relationship between history 
and experience
13
. Both in the reign of historical representation and in the domain of 
memory, the issue has always been that they both “begin with a gap between us and the 
past”14.  
This is not the place to explore the contradictions between linguistic utterances 
and their truth-contents, or between memories and history. It will suffice to say that it is 
only from, or through, our contemporary present tensions that we may produce, or 
uncover, or recover, a story of distant emotional life. Not surprisingly, the proliferation 
on memory studies, very often triggered by either the obligation to remember or by the 
right to forget, has come about as a new form of post-Second World War 
historiographical revolution. The collision between lived experience (Geschichte) and 
the form of that narrative we call history (Historie) is felt everywhere in our 
contemporary world, but it is particularly pressing in the case of the history of emotions, 
where the use of ego-sources, like diaries, auto-biographies and the like, seems to be a 
necessary requirement to dig into emotional practices or representations. The 
connection between past and present, memories and histories, emotions and politics, 
comes in many different varieties. But my concern here is not with in the political 
emotions studied by the philosopher Martha Nusbaum or with the relationship between 
emotional practices and political discourse explored by the anthropologists Michelle Z. 
Rosaldo o Catherine A. Lutz
15
. I want to defend a situated history as a precondition to 
explore the regimes of visibility of emotions and passions. To do so, I will first explore 
the history of emotional expression and repression in the work of Peter N. Stearns. 
Secondly, I will attempt to show the need for a politics of emotions and, more in 
particular, for a politics of pain. To illustrate my point, I will refer to two recent books, 
                                                 
12. Some of the best examples of “performative contradictions” are the, on the other hand, excellent 
(intellectual) histories of social constructivism. See, for example, Dominique PESTRE, “Pour une histoire 
sociale et culturelle des sciences, nouvelles définitions, nouveaux objets, nouvelles pratiques’, Annales 
HSS, mai-juin, n. 3, (1995), pp. 487-522. 
13. David CARR, Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World, 
Oxford, 2014 
14. Ibidem, p. 3 
15. Martha C. NUSSBAUM, Political Emotions : Why Love Matters for Justice. Cambridge, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2013. 
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the first on the history of cruelty, by Margaret Abbruzzo, and the second on the history 
of political responsibilities towards sufferers, by Keith Weiloo.  
 
Emotional Expressions and Political Repressions 
“Choosing to express or repress a feeling, choosing to obey or ignore 
conventions about feelings, can be an explicit political act”16. As many anthropologists 
have already declared, the study of emotions is not so much about private feelings as it 
is about power relations
17
. Johanna Bourke has put it very clearly: “Emotions lead to a 
negotiation of the boundaries between the self and other or one community and 
another”18. As far as I am aware, this political approach within the history of emotions 
was first proposed by the emotionology of Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns. Their 
seminal paper of 1985 came to propose the development of a research programme in the 
historical changes of “emotional standards”19. By this expression, they referred to the 
written or non-written rules that determined the way in which emotions had to be 
expressed within certain cultural settings. Following the steps of Norbert Elias, 
emotionology attempted to clarify how changes in the rules that regulate emotional 
expressions could account for other social changes, or conversely, how social changes, 
such as those related to social and economic diversification, for example, could be held 
responsible for social conventions of emotional life. According to Stearns, the attempt 
to produce a social history of emotions suffered from two major historiographical 
problems. First, it was necessary to clarify to what extent the modern parameters of 
family life had changed in relation to the pre-modern world. Much of the Stearns’ 
discussion, including their interest in differentiating between (hidden) experiences and 
(public) expressions, led to a critical re-evaluation of some of the seminal works on the 
history of childhood, violence, family or love
20
. Secondly, it was essential to discern 
whether social history was anchored in a purely rational explanation of collective 
action
21
. Thirty years after the connection between emotional standards and political 
practices were first explicitly made, the role emotions have played in the social shaping 
of the world can no longer be denied: “While concerned with the most personal of 
subjects, human feelings, the investigations [of the history of emotions] have 
demonstrated that emotions have larger social and political implications and can shape 
public realities”.22  
                                                 
16. Susan J. MATT and Peter N. STEARNS, Doing Emotions History, Urbana, Chicago and Springfield, 
University of Illinois Press, 2014, p. 5.  
17. Lila ABU-LUGHOD and Catherine A. LUTZ, “Introduction. Emotion Discourse and the Politics of 
Everyday Life”, in Language and the Politics of Emotion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
18. Joanna BOURKE, “Fear and Anxiety: Writing about Emotion in Modern History”, History Workshop 
Journal, 55, 2003, p. 124.  
19. Peter STEARNS and Carol Z. STEARNS, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and 
Emotional Standards”, American Historical Review, 90, 4 (1985), pp. 813–836.  
20. See for example Peter N. STEARNS, Childhood in World History, London and New York, Routledge, 
2006.  
21. See Ute FREVERT, Emotions in History: Lost and Found, Budapest, Central European University 
Press, 2011, ‘Introduction: The Historical Economy of Emotions”.  
22. MATT and STEARNS, Doing Emotions History, “Introduction”.  
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In a recent chapter on modern patterns in emotions history, Peter N. Stearns 
underlines how scholars have not given a clear answer to the question of emotional 
change. For one thing, he argues “modernity” is a contested notion. Furthermore, since 
emotions have biological bases, emotions history entails difficulties regarding the 
question of stability and change. Finally, in his view, scholarship oscillates between 
emphasizing continuity and arguing in favour of discontinuity. Perhaps he could have 
added the new interest in the history of emotional experiences, as something different 
from the description of social rules and regulations of human passions. The possibility 
to explore the experiences of the past, and not just the social regimen of their 
manifestations, adds a renew vantage to the debate.
23
 While in 1988, Stearns were 
willing to recognize “some distinction, though not necessarily a complete distinction, 
between emotional standards and emotional experiences”24, his new approach leaves 
plenty of room for inquiries about emotional experiences. It is in this aspect that the 
work of William M. Reddy, whose work was also inspired by a clear and declared 
political position, deserves attention in this context.  
Reddy’s The Navigation of Feeling (2001) was initially intended to explore a 
middle ground in which emotions could be understood in both a biological and cultural 
setting, without losing sight of their role in a historiography of historical change
25
. 
Following John L. Austin’s speech act theory, Reddy agreed that emotions, and not just 
their expressions, had an essentially performative character. In line with the sociology 
of René Girard or Erving Goffman on the staging of experiences, Reddy understood that 
the products and practices of culture not only reflected social experiences: they also 
built them. This discursive performativity, however, had to be counterbalanced so that it 
could leave space for social change and value judgement. As a type of speech that both 
describes and changes the world, “emotives” -one of the key terms introduced by Reddy 
to build a new theoretical framework-, were essential for this re-conception of 
emotional liberty and, in turn, for the understanding of the cultural variations and 
explanation of historical change.  
Despite this pioneering and highly sophisticated approach, Reddy’s theoretical 
model for the history of emotions has been subjected to different and severe criticisms. 
For Jean Plampler, for example, the framework was “logocentric”, in the sense that 
emotives, and emotions for that matter, seem to be restricted to their linguistic 
dimension. More important for our purposes, Plamper also considers that the 
relationship between Reddy’s theory and politics was somehow circular, in the sense 
that he must have chosen only those theories of cognitive psychology that suited his 
political ideas whereas, at the same time, claiming that the political implications of his 
emotional framework were just a consequence of the preference for those emotional 
                                                 
23. Peter N. STEARNS, “Modern Patterns in Emotions History”, in MATT and STEARNS, Doing Emotions 
History, chapter 1, pp 17-40. For his previous vision, see for example. 
24. See Carol Z. STEARNS and Peter N. STEARNS, Emotions and Social Change, London, New York, 
Holmes & Meier, 1988. “The attempt to handle change accurately involves, finally, an increasing 
willingness to recognize some distinction, though not necessarily a complete distinction, between 
emotional standards and emotional experiences”, p. 7. 
25. On REDDY, see Jan PLAMPER, The History of Emotions. An Introduction. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, chapter IV: “Perspectives in the History of Emotions”, pp. 251-265. 
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regimes that would produce less emotional suffering
26
. Despite all these criticisms, there 
are two elements from Reddy’s work that I would like to underline here. Firstly is his 
awareness of the political dimension to the history of emotions: “researchers on 
emotions in fields other than anthropology have frequently neglected the political 
implications of their work”27. Secondly, his understanding that, ultimately, the history 
of emotions is nothing more than the history of emotional suffering
28
. It is only his 
concept of “emotional liberty”, defined as the capacity to undergo conversion 
experiences and changes of emotional goals, what “allows for a political relevant 
definition of [emotional] suffering”29. In turn, emotional suffering plays an essential 
role in developing a kind of history that is neither Eurocentric nor progressive. Despite 
all criticisms, Reddy has attempted to free scholars of the necessity of theorizing 
culture, power, class, race, gender or ethnicity. “The only questions that need to be 
asked are, Who suffers? Is the suffering an unavoidable consequence of emotional 
navigation or does this suffering help to shore up a restrictive emotional regime? That 
is, is this suffering a tragedy or an injustice?”30  
 
Politics of pain 
In the first chapter of her outstanding book on pain and slavery, Margaret 
Abruzzo claims that causing another to suffer did not, by itself, amount to cruelty: “nor 
was inflicting bodily pain the defining ingredient in seventeenth-century usage of 
cruelty”31. Though she refers in this sentence to the changing Quaker attitudes towards 
the infliction of physical pain, the same reasoning may apply to many other historical 
instances in which suffering is simultaneously visible (for the historian) and partially 
invisible for (at least some of) our historical subjects. Since physical violence may 
count as either cruelty, judicial justice or well-deserved punishment, pain sometimes 
remains not just culturally accepted, but also socially and historically hidden. In fact, if 
bodily pain was not, as Abruzzo argues, the defining ingredient of cruelty, on what 
grounds will we be allowed to make it visible? How can a history of pain be built on 
elusive evidences?  
Despite the evidential blurriness, Abruzzo’s own understanding of the rise of 
humanitarianism from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries seems to be 
anchored in the relative invisibility of physical pain. Cruelty, she claims, was a key 
element in the moral philosophy that went along antislavery movements, “but not 
initially because Anglo-Americans had devoted great energy to the problems of physical 
pain or the experience of that pain”32; rather, what was at stake in early antislavery 
                                                 
26. PLAMPER, The History of Emotions, pp. 262-263. See also BOURKE: ‘Fear and Anxiety”, pp. 111-132; 
and BOURKE, The Story of Pain, p. 121. According to BOURKE, to argue that historians can only analyze 
emotions discursively does not require a denial that emotions have a physiology. 
27. William M. REDDY, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2001 p. 112. See also, REDDY, “Against Constructionism: The 
Historical Ethnography of Emotions”, Current Anthropology, 38/3 (1997), pp. 327-51. 
28. REDDY, Navigation, p. 122. 
29. Ibidem, p. 123. 
30. Ibidem, p. 130.  
31. ABRUZZO, Polemical Pain, p. 17.  
32. Ibidem, p. 52.  
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movements was the role played by both the perpetrators and the witnesses to it. The link 
between pain and cruelty was never immediate, in the sense that cruelty was defined in 
terms of unnecessary painful experiences. To bring these issues to our contemporary 
debates, it will be enough to argue that, in order to oppose bullfighting, for example, 
there is no need to assume the sensorial position of the bull. One may condemn the 
entertainment and celebration of suffering without being concerned about the 
experience of the animal. According to Abruzzo, that was exactly what provided the 
bases for early humanitarianism: “Humanitarian concern about cruelty was never a 
straightforward, simple concern about pain or the experience of victims. It was not pain, 
but objections to the deliberate and unnecessary infliction of pain, that provided the 
intellectual impulse of humanitarianism”33. This emphasis on infliction comes to 
suggest that compassion was not “irresistible”, as Norman S. Fiering has suggested34. 
Neither did the narrative of compassion arise from the myriad detailed narratives of the 
body in pain, as Thomas Lacqueur claimed
35
. The humanitarian narrative, far from 
being naturally connected to the distant pain of others, appeared as a heterogeneous set 
of moral discourses that were not always inspired by the visibility of pain and the social 
acknowledgement of physical suffering
36
. Even the presence and visibility of pain did 
not necessarily imply any kind of moral commitment or social obligation. On the 
contrary, the representation of bodily pain, in anti-vivisection or anti-slavery narratives, 
for example, very often turned the explicit depiction of suffering into an object that 
appealed to the prurient gaze of the reader. As Mary A. Favret and Karen Halttunen 
have argued, the pornographic dimension of early humanitarianism, the erotic transport 
that many viewers seemed to enjoy when facing distant suffering, remains anchored in 
our historical DNA
37
.  
For many historians, nineteenth-century narratives on the history of anaesthesia, 
of education or of punitive justice were not truly concerned with pain. In the case of the 
history of anaesthesia, for example, whereas some authors have emphasized what was 
achieved with the discovery, others have turned their attention to the efforts made to 
legitimize the new profession, sometimes even calling into question the significance 
that physical suffering played in these disputes
38
. And they may very well be right. 
Since the priority was not always the alleviation or treatment of pain, it cannot come as 
a surprise that this suffering become hidden behind disputes related to professionalism 
or credit. And yet, there remains the question: if pain was invisible, how do we know of 
                                                 
33. Ibidem, p. 63. Her emphasis.  
34. Norman S. FIERING, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth Century Sympathy and 
Humanitarianism”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (1976) 2, pp. 195-218. 
35. Thomas LAQUEUR, “Bodies, Details and the Humanitarian Narrative”, in Lynn HUNT (ed.), The New 
Cultural History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 176-204. 
36. Kathleen KENNEDY, “On Writing the History of the Body in Pain Cultural History”, Cultural History, 
vol. 4, 1 (2015), pp. 87-106. 
37. Mary A. FAVRET, “Flogging: The Anti-Slavery Movement Writes Pornography” in Anne JAROWITZ 
(ed.), Romanticism and Gender, Cambridge, D.S. Brewer, 1998. Thomas L. HASKELL, “Capitalism and 
the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility,” American Historical Review, 90 (June 1985), pp. 547-566. 
38. Alison WINTER, “Ethereal Epidemic: Mesmerism and the Introduction of Inhalation Anaesthesia to 
Early Victoria London,” in The Society for the Social History of Science, (1991), p. 1. See also Stephanie 
J. SNOW’S, Operations without Pain, The Practice and Science of Anaesthesia in Victorian Britain, 
London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.  
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its existence? How have we, contemporary historians and readers, become aware of 
subjective emotions that were only indirectly addressed?  
These very same questions applied to most recent book written on this problem. 
Pain. A Political History, by Keith Wailoo, is an extraordinary book on the history of 
liberalism and conservatism around physical suffering. The book traces how the 
question of other people’s pain became a recurring site for political battles. For Wailoo, 
the reality of pain has never been only a clinical or scientific problem. On the contrary, 
the understanding of pain, of real pain, requires the mobilization of many sources and 
many different communities. The history of pain involves a political dimension, since 
what counts as pain depends not just on the testimony of those who complain, but on the 
negotiations of our standards of trust. Visualizing pain and accepting other’s complaints 
requires a joint effort of agreement between not only medical doctors, but also 
politicians, pharmaceutical companies, quacks, and different kinds of associations, from 
veterans’ to housewives’. Conversely, however, the public comprehension and 
understanding of pain also works as a Trojan horse, in the sense that, once it enters the 
public arena, what counts as pain will also determine or challenge our ideas of 
compassion and sympathy. This means that the political dimension of pain cannot 
possibly be avoided. It is not simply a social feature that will have to be added to some 
other physiological or psychological characteristics. On the contrary, the public 
dimension of pain implies that pain, real pain, and not feigned or exaggerated pain, for 
example, lies truly embedded within political concerns and social values. In judging 
chronic pains sufferers, explains Wailoo, doctors confront several political assessments, 
including the question of converting disability rating into monetary benefits. Since the 
problem of pain was, to a certain extent, a question of trust, its assessment and treatment 
was always embedded into the discourse of those who defended the welfare state and 
those who were convinced of the pathological malingering of many complainers: 
“culture, not science, defined what pain meant”39. 
In the conclusion of this extraordinary book, Wailoo acknowledges that “the 
uses of pain have nothing to do with truth, but rather with drama”40. From the point of 
view of its theatricality, pain is experienced and valued under the form of a dramatic 
structure. This implies that the historical analysis of this unpleasant experience involves 
the afflicted as well as the observer, including, and this is the key point here, the set of 
historians and social scientists who, by describing the invisibility of pain and pain 
experiences, contribute to uncover a new form of social awareness. In this regard, 
Wailoo, who agrees that pain fraud exists, found that there was no need to add to the 
scrutiny of sufferers to accuse them of deceitfulness. He reminds us that “pain fraud 
includes the artful quacks and drug makers through history, promising fast relief while 
fomenting anguish and dependence”41. Since the problem of pain and social welfare 
came to define American political theater, Wailoo remains far from falling into 
performative contradictions. His book shows a sinuous story in which pain, true pain, 
emerges through multiple negotiations. The question is not only whose pain should 
matter, but which pains should be silently endured, and which may be socially 
expressed and accepted.  
                                                 
39. WAILOO. Pain, p. 83. 
40. Ibidem, p. 202. The quotation is from J. MOSCOSO, Pain. A Cultural History, New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012, p. 43.  
41. WAILOO, Pain, p. 212.  
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Many of these examples affect a single case that may be somehow representative 
of wider and deeper tensions. More interestingly, however, are those instances where 
the invisibility or visibility of pain, its scopic regimen, to use the expression first coined 
by film theorist Christian Metz and later employed by philosopher Martin Jay, affects 
whole populations or human groups, for in these instances, emotional invisibility is also 
very often justified by the historical treatment. The politics of pain, as a complement to 
the study of its theatricality or the rhetoric tools employed to generate conviction, is not 
just another example of historical scrutiny: the scopic regimen of pain and its history 
affects the very nature of historical writing. 
 
Conclusions 
It is only through the experience of the vanquished, wrote the German 
philosopher Reinhardt Kosellek in a very beautiful and thought-provoking essay about 
the transformation of history and historicity, that we may turn experiences into 
knowledge, that we can be willing to accept cultural and historical change
42
. Though 
these ideas have plenty of examples, pain studies, as they were understood in the 
1990’s, were just a very good indication of this tendency. Despite their multiple 
variations, the seminal works of David B. Morris or Rosalyne Rey came to recover and 
sometimes uncover the experience of the vanquished, of the losers of clinical 
medicine
43
. Their approach attempted to take patients’ words at face value, while paying 
attention to their expressions, their ailments and their miseries. What those historians 
and literary critics were doing almost thirty years ago was the side-effect of what 
military surgeons, anaesthesiologists and neurologists claimed to be doing in the 
1960’s: extending the humanitarian gaze. These historians were not just calling into 
question the bio-mechanical model of pain, but also a mechanical understanding of 
history. David B. Morris’ distinction, for example, between “modern” and “post-
modern” pain came to suggest that the two turning points in the history of pain 
treatment had been related to two different forms of experience that requested different 
historical narratives
44
. If the discovery of chemical anaesthesia in the mid-nineteenth 
century was strongly related to the understanding of the modern, acute, peripheral, bio-
mechanical conception of pain, the appearance of pain as an object of medical practice, 
of the pharmaceutical industry, and of the cultural market in the mid twentieth-century 
was related to the chronic, central, and bio-cultural notion of post-modern pain. In both 
episodes, however, there was a clear correlation between pain and history, between pain 
and trauma.  
As a job for “eminent amateurs”, as Febvre put it, the history of pain, as any 
other history of experience, demands a “situated historiography”, able to discriminate 
between repressed emotions and false expressions. By “situated historiography”, I refer 
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here to the same kind of standpoint epistemology of situated knowledge advocated by 
Helen Longino and other feminist theorists
45
. In a very influential review essay, the 
historian Sarah Maza considered in 1996 two big theoretical influences in cultural 
history: the anthropology of Clifford Geerz and Victor Turner, and the feminist 
approach
46
. As long as the history of pain refers to the history of experiences, and not 
just to the history of emotional standards, the anthropology of experience seems an 
unavoidable step. But the same applies to the defence of a historical consciousness that 
may narrow the gap between the past and the present.  
What Sarah Ahmed has named “the contingency of pain” was based on what she 
thought was the impossibility to explore in detail the subjective experience of the pain 
of others
47
. We cannot possibly agree. If our historical account does not want to fall into 
performative contradictions, “sentimental history” must be able to explore and uncover 
the invisible emotions of the vanquished; the solitary suffering of those whose pain has 
been forgotten. We know very well that lower back pain is almost a consummate post-
modern malady, but we also know that it is a very rare condition in developing 
countries. This pain, the most frequent cause of limited activity in the West in persons 
under 45, is however ignored, or unreported, in the rest of the world. We are very much 
aware that the majority of people who have spent their lives gripped by pain find no 
place in the history of medicine. To mention just another example: the distinction 
between acute pain and chronic pain, which served as a basis for the historical 
explanation for the emergence of pain medicine, or as David B. Morris called it “post-
modern pain,” is not a prerogative of the twentieth century, nor does it in itself explain 
the development of palliative medicine
48
. The limited use of the expression “chronic 
pain” does not allow us to understand the systematic concealment of groups of people 
whose living conditions we would today consider terrible. The reasons for which, until 
recently, histories of pain had left aside the evolving and always complex social 
attitudes regarding children’s pain, or the reasons why visceral and, more specifically, 
cancer pain was usually ignored in our twenty-first century historical narratives, are 
only two indications of the way in which we have built our history upon the foundations 
of enlightened humanitarian politics. Though phantom limb pain is a much more 
infrequent condition than cancer pain, we still prefer to address the pain of those who 
will not be soon forgotten or whose testimonies and maybe even their lives, will not be 
soon spared.  
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